Over the past few months, China has published its development plans for the 13th Five Year Plan [FYP] period [2016][2017][2018][2019][2020] for energy, and separately for the electricity sector, renewable energy, hydro, wind, solar, and biomass energy. Here, we review these policies, as well as a number of key supporting policy documents that aim at increased renewable energy use in China. Presuming that China will not overshoot its growth targets for wind and PV, annual additions over the 13th FYP period will average 16 GW for wind and 13.5 GW for PV, well below the growth levels seen in recent years. The key to success in China's continued transition to renewable energy, however, does not lie in such capacity additions alone. At least as important will be the efforts at improving grid interconnectedness, flexibility of generating capacity and the grid, market mechanisms that will reduce and spread electricity demand, and better enable renewables to compete, and efforts at increasing the level of consumption of the renewable power generated.
Introduction
The years 2016 through 2020 make up China's 13th Five-Year-Plan [FYP] period. Here, we review the 13th FYP development plans for different energy sources, and put these goals in context by comparing with policy targets and achievements throughout the previous FYP period, and/or by explaining policy rationales by highlighting the issues that the Chinese power sector faces. We zoom in such issues for modern renewables, by including in our review a number of supporting policies that aim at increased renewable energy consumption. Together, this provides an up-to-date and comprehensive overview of the status quo and plans for the next 5 years of China's renewable power sector development.
ON THE MAP
China's next renewable energy revolution: goals and mechanisms in the 13th Five Year Plan for energy Targets and Mechanisms in the 13th FYP for the Electricity Sector and Renewable Energy Overall The 13th FYP reiterate an earlier announced goal of a 15% share of non-fossil energy in total primary energy consumption by 2020, and 20% by 2030. Power consumption in 2020 is expected to be 6800-7200 TWh, at an average annual growth of 3.6-4.8%. Per capita consumption will be circa 5000 kWh, close to the level in "moderately developed countries". Renewable power production is targeted to grow to 1900 TWh, or 27% of total power generation. In order to prevent power shortages affecting economic development, generating capacity is to be developed "moderately ahead of demand growth", with suggested reserves of 200 TWh [1] . Targets are summarized in Table 1 . Ethanol  kt  1800  4000  2100  4000  13 2  Diesel  kt  500  1000  800  2000  10 2  Biogas  mln m3  14,000  22,000  19,000  -45 2  Bio-natural gas  mln m3  ---8000  33 2 Coal Different from earlier Five-Year-Plans, which had indicative growth targets, the 13th FYP for the electricity sector strives to contain coal-fired power generation capacity, to below 1100 GW [ Table 1 ]. In large part, this is due to considerable over-capacity in coal-fired power generation built up during the 12th FYP period. Total power demand in 2015 fell 450 TWh short of what was forecasted at the beginning of the 12th FYP period [ Table 1 ]. This slower growth is due to what is called the "new normal" of less rapid economic growth, restructuring in energyintensive sectors, as well as considerable success in energysaving programs [2] [3] [4] . Demand for thermal power has further been reduced by considerable growth in output from renewables [ Tables 1 and 2 ]. The overcapacity has severely impacted operating profit of coal-fired power plants, as average productivity has sharply fallen from circa 5300 full-load hours to just over 4000 h in recent years [ Table 2 ]. This also means the stated target of 200 TWh of power generation reserves is already well exceeded. In line with this, Yuan et al. [5] recently estimated that no additional coal-fired capacity at all is needed by 2020. Growing overcapacity has already prompted a moratorium on any additional projects starting construction in 15 provinces, until the end of 2017, with 13 of these provinces also not allowed to issue new permits [6] . The only exception are CHP plants for city-heating. The NEA has further demanded that projects under construction are reduced in size or delayed, to keep the pace with market demand growth [6, 7] . The 13th FYP for the electricity sector continues this trend, with a stated goal of canceling 1 Full-load hours are not the same as TWh/GW in each row, as these are corrected for the period of time newly installed capacity has been online. Data on full-load hours, GW and TWh are all from the same statistical report [63] . 2 Full-load hours are for thermal power generation, which is predominantly but not all coal; 3 Estimate based on similar productivity as in 2010. 4 No productivity data is provided by the CEC; calculated as power output, divided by installed capacity last year plus half of capacity growth in current year. 5 Refers to grid-connected plants using forestry residues, agricultural residues incl. bagasse, and waste incineration; 6 Assuming same growth in 2016 as in 2015.
Sources: China Electricity Council for years 2010-2015 [63] . 2005 data from [64] . or slowing down the construction of at least 150 GW of coal-fired projects. The pace and scale of construction of coal-fired power bases should be adapted to power demand, and the availability of long-distance transmission capacity to remote markets [1] . For emission reduction and energy savings, 420 GW is to be retrofitted for ultra-low emissions, 340 GW to be retrofitted for energy-savings, and another 20 GW of technologically backward generation capacity taken out of operation. Total emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides are to be halved [ Table 1 ].
A further key point is improved dispatching control. The three Northern regions have cold winters, and therefore a lot of CHP capacity. This is also where most wind farms are located, and more flexibility is needed. To deal with this, 133 GW of CHP units are to undergo flexibility retrofits, a further 82 GW should undergo a pure condensing retrofit, and 45 GW of peaking capacity should be added. In the rest of the country, 4.5 GW should undergo a pure condensing retrofit, and 1 GW of peaking capacity is to be added. In order to help balance renewable forms of power generation, the NEA has further demanded individual provinces to plan sufficient flexible coal-fired capacity. Such capacity should be able to throttle down to 50% or 60% of rated output, for units with capacity below or above 300 MW, respectively [8] . The measure further encourages on-site power plants in industry to contribute to flexible generation in dealing with temporary demand peaks.
Hydro
The focus of conventional hydropower development is on large hydropower bases (i.e., very large scale [collections] of dams) in Sichuan, Yunnan, and Tibet. The operational capacity of seven hydropower bases currently stands at 122 GW, to be expanded to 138 GW by 2020, and eventually to 222 GW [9] . Simultaneously, long-distance transmission capacity for the so-called "West-to-East electricity transfer" project will be expanded, to transport the hydropower to the load centers in the East [see also Table 1 and Grid construction]. In order to improve dispatch ability, there are plans for research on and implementation of joint dispatching mechanisms for cascaded hydropower, and formulation of optimal scheduling operation procedures and technical standards for cascaded hydropower [9] . Development in small and medium-sized catchment areas is to be limited, in order to preserve ecological habitats in these watersheds. In Sichuan and Yunnan provinces, where hydropower curtailment is severe, development of small and medium-sized hydropower without dispatching control will not be allowed over the 13th FYP period. Projects for poverty alleviation are exempt from this moratorium, and even promoted. Such projects are to investigate and implement possibilities for public sharing of earnings from hydropower development in poor areas, possibly with local residents or communities receiving an equity share in such projects as partial compensation for loss of land [9, 10] .
A second component is the expansion of pumped storage hydro power, with reservoirs concentrated closer to load centers in the East, Central, and North China. Over the 13th FYP period, construction should start on circa 60 GW of pumped storage hydropower, with operational capacity reaching 40 GW by 2020. The pumped storage reservoirs are not only meant as immediately dispatchable capacity for peak-shaving, but are encouraged to function as energy storage specifically for remote, large-scale wind or PV bases, and thus facilitate renewable energy consumption [9, 11] .
Gas
The key policy driver for gas-fired power is flexible capacity, which currently has a limited share in generation capacity [12] . In addition to fully utilizing the flexibility of existing natural gas power plants, the plan targets 50 GW of additional flexible capacity by natural gas power plants [ Table 1 ]. Of this, 15 GW will be tri-generation of power, heating, and cooling. The plan further asks for a number of combined cycle CHP projects, and support for projects using coal-bed methane, gasified coal, blast furnace gas, and other gasses [1] .
Nuclear
Over the 13th FYP period, circa 30 GW of additional nuclear power is planned to come online, and construction shall start on a further 30 GW or more. Expansion will be in the coastal provinces, but the plan asks for feasibility studies on inland plants as well. A number of projects utilize the AP1000 reactor, a Westinghouse design, manufactured by domestic industries. Future additions will include demonstration projects using the CAP1400, a Chinese development based on the Westinghouse design, and the HPR-1000, or "Hualong one", a domestically developed Advanced Pressurised Water Reactor that China aims to compete with in global markets [1, 13, 14] .
Wind
The 13th FYP shifts the development pattern of wind power. The main focus of the 11th and 12th FYP periods was the construction of large-scale wind farms, including seven wind power bases, of 10 GW or more each [12, 15] . These were built up in the Northern regions, which have plenty of sparsely populated plains, and are rich in wind resources. Currently, circa 80% of China's wind power installations is located in the North, North-West and North-East regions, or the "Three Norths". These have faced severe curtailment issues, because of relatively inflexible generation capacity in local grids, in particular during the winter heating period, when CHP district heating plants must be kept on, and because of limited long-distance transmission to larger load centers, mostly outside of the "Three Norths" region [16, 17] .
The 13th FYP divides the country into two parts; the "Three Norths" and the rest of the country. Development is strongly pushed towards the latter: 60% of the circa 75 GW targeted increase over the 13th FYP period will be outside of the Norths [ Table 3 ]. More importantly, the development target for the North is a maximum, whereas the 70 GW target for the rest of the country is considered a minimum. To stimulate the development in the rest of the country, the plan promotes improved resource surveys of the more dispersed wind resources there, more distributed wind farm development, and support for improved low speed wind turbine technology [more on this regional imbalance, and implications for policy planning in 18]. The Northern regions are allowed to develop new farms only when local markets are capable of absorbing the additional wind power production. 40 GW interprovincial transmission capacity (see also Grid construction) is allocated to help wind farms [and other renewables] in the North transport power to remote markets, but priority for the use of this capacity is given to the existing stock of wind farms [19] .
In 2015, curtailment of wind power in the North had grown to 33.9 TWh, or 15.4% of all wind power actually produced [more in Measures for the guaranteed minimum purchase of renewable power]. The 13th FYP plan demands that curtailment is brought down to "reasonable levels", albeit without specifying a target. In the press conference presenting the plan, the spokesperson for the NEA indicated this would be considered as 5% or less [20] . Earlier in 2016, the NEA had already issued two separate measures to contain over-investment in regions with severe curtailment [see Wind power investment warning mechanism], and to guarantee that grid companies purchase all wind power generated [see Measures for the guaranteed minimum purchase of renewable power]. Further, a number of demonstration projects have started to use wind power for district heating. Seasonal output of wind power matches well with the heating demand, in winter periods, and heating grids are much less sensitive to short-term fluctuations than power grids [21] . Still, efficiency of pure electric boilers lags that of CHP district heating plants, and the policy promoting its use suggests a limited scale, and only as a means to reduce wind power curtailment, with 1 GW of such projects suggested, spread out over Shanxi, Liaoning and Xinjiang [22] . The 210 GW target for wind is lower than the 250 GW range announced earlier in the draft version of the 13th FYP for renewable energy [23] , presumably because of the challenges with effective consumption of the wind power generated. All values as MW. Source: [19, 65] .
Offshore wind power is targeted to be at 5 GW by 2020, with another 10 GW under construction [ Table 4 ]. The 5 GW target is the same level as what the 12th FYP plan for renewable energy originally targeted for 2015, and well below the 30 GW that plan targeted for 2020 [24] . Reasons why offshore wind power hasn't developed as quickly as policy makers had hoped include relatively immature equipment from domestic manufacturers, limited co-ordination of governmental departments involved in planning processes, and tendering procedures resulting in bids well below profitable levels [25, 26] . The 13th FYP plan for wind power speaks of improved pricing policies, but without further specification. Existing feed-in tariffs of 0.85 RMB/kWh for off-shore and 0.75 RMB/kWh for inter-tidal farms, introduced in 2014, were recently extended [19, 27] .
In terms of domestic industry and technology development, the 13th FYP and the recent "Made in China 2025" Plan strive for fully domestically developed turbines of 10+ MW, including offshore turbines, by 2020, and 30 MW turbines by 2050. Three to five Chinese equipment manufacturers should be at an advanced level internationally, and have significantly improved global market shares [19, 28] .
Solar power
The 110 GW target for PV, like that for wind, is well below the 150 GW target announced earlier in the draft version of the 13th FYP for renewable energy [23] . Similarly, the 13th FYP shifts the development pattern of PV, as it did for wind power. Whereas the 12th FYP period saw a rapid build-up of PV mainly in large-scale PV plants [29] , the 13th FYP plan targets nearly all additional installations to be with distributed forms of PV [ Table 1 ].
Poverty alleviation programs aim to provide PV panels to 2.8 million households, generating 3000 RMB of additional income per household [28] . For large-scale PV bases, it is stressed that these should prioritize consumption in local electricity markets, or otherwise have connection to an Ultra High Voltage [UHV] long-distance transmission cable [more in Grid construction]. Further construction of such bases in the North, specifically Qinghai and Inner Mongolia, can continue in a pace corresponding with local market or UHV transport capacity. In the Southwest, further construction of such bases can continue, utilizing hydropower for balancing power output, and existing UHV transmission channels for hydropower bases [28] . The principle of prioritizing local consumption is similar with that for wind, but with less restrictive language on further development.
In terms of domestic industry and technology development, the 13th FYP targets domestic development of advanced crystalline silicon PV cells with a conversion efficiency of 23% or more, as well as significantly improved and industrialized thin film PV cell production. Power generation costs should halve by 2020, becoming comparable with grid sales prices.
For solar thermal projects, the NDRC announced a Feed-in tariff of 1.15 RMB/kWh in September of 2016 [30] . By 2020, solar thermal cost should be reduced to 0.8 RMB/kWh [28] . A first batch of 20 solar thermal demonstration projects using different types of technology [tower, Fresnel, through] and total capacity of 1.35 GW was recently approved [31] .
Biomass
Targets for biomass power have changed focus from cropand forestry residue based power generation to waste incineration. The 7 GW target for the former is below the 2015 target from the 12th FYP [24] , and well below the 24 GW targeted by 2020 in the 11th FYP period [32] . Problems plaguing the sector have been relatively immature technologies from domestic suppliers, with availability far below break-even levels, unexpectedly strong increases in crop residue prices, imperfect coordination of spatial planning leading to competition over fuel between neighboring plants, and a strong focus on pure electric rather than more profitable CHP projects [33] [34] [35] . The 13th FYP for biomass further stresses a need to reduce fraud with Feed-in tariff subsidies collected by biomass power plants that are mixing in coal, something which might have cooled policy makers' enthusiasm [36] . The plan further promotes CHP for new projects and retrofitting to CHP for existing projects, and an increased use of densified biomass fuels in retrofitted coal-fired boilers for heating of residential and commercial buildings.
Liquid biomass fuels, too, have fallen short of targeted growth [ Table 1 ]. The target for bio-ethanol is well below the 2020 target of 10,000 kt from the 11th FYP period, whilst the 2020 target for biodiesel is the same [32] . Source: [19] .
Similar to biomass power generation, development of these fuels has been plagued by technological immaturity, in particular for nonfood crop biofuels, which the strongly politically preferred variety in China, as well as sensitivity to feedstock availability and prices [37, 38] . Priority areas for technological development support over the 13th FYP period are these liquid fuels, and bio-natural gas. This includes supporting bio-ethanol projects of a size of 100 kt each [36] .
Grid construction
Despite a strongly centralized planning of power grid infrastructure, inter-provincial power trading has long been limited, with existing inter-provincial connections long considered backup facilities to prop up temporary shortfalls in power supply rather than these being the backbone of a unified national grid [39] . Growing regional imbalances, with energy bases for thermal power, hydro, wind, and solar mostly being built far away from the load centers in the East, have made it increasingly necessary to expand this inter-provincial and inter-regional transport capacity [29, 39, 40] . For this purpose, China has been working on the "West-to-East electricity transfer" project since the early 2000s. Over the 12th FYP, construction was started on a large UHV grid with three main North-South and three West-East corridors [40] . Current plans seek to expand this grid, including to areas further North and West [for a good map see 12] . The target of 270 GW of capacity seems set to be exceeded; total capacity of UHV projects built, under construction or approved for construction already stood at 312 GW, with a total line length of 32,000 km, halfway through 2016 [41] . Many of these lines connect with wind and solar power bases [ Table 5 ].
Supporting Policy Mechanisms
Measures for the guaranteed minimum purchase of renewable power
The build-up of wind and PV power bases in grid regions with little flexibility in the "Three Norths" has resulted in high levels of curtailment [ Tables 6 and 7 ]. The 38.8 TWh of wind and PV power curtailed is roughly equal to the total wind power consumption in the UK in 2015 [42] . This is one of the reasons why China, despite leading in installations, trails the US in terms of wind power consumption [43] .
To combat this, the NEA has stipulated "guaranteed minimum full-load hours" for provinces where curtailment is most severe [44, 45] . Grid enterprises must sign a contract for the purchase of these amounts each year, and award highest priority dispatch rights to these projects [ Tables 6 and 7 ]. Renewable power projects will receive the local feed-in tariff, or the price agreed on in the tender for the project. The guarantee does not cover hours the project is not available due to maintenance, or less than forecasted output due to low winds or solar radiation. To encourage consumption beyond the guaranteed minima, owners of renewable power projects are encouraged to sign long-term power supply contracts directly with power consumers, and engage in spot-market trading [where such markets exist]. Whatever price is agreed upon in such trading mechanisms, projects will still receive subsidies equal to the locally applicable feed-in tariff minus the benchmark price for coal-fired power [44] .
Distributed PV, biomass, geothermal, and marine energy projects should also receive contracts with priority rights, clear pricing, and guaranteed amounts of power purchased, but should "temporarily" not engage in such market competition [45] .
The 1800-2000 full-load hours guaranteed for wind power projects, or capacity factors of 20.5-23%, are a considerable increase from current levels in provinces with high levels of curtailment [ Table 6 ]. Still, they are well below the average potential capacity factor of 31.9% of China's existing wind farms [43] .
Wind power investment warning mechanism
The imbalance of wind power production and capacity for consumption in local grids is also due to excessive wind farm development. To reduce such over-investment, the NEA has launched a monitoring and early warning mechanism for wind power investment risk [46] .
The mechanism specifies very clear criteria for investment risk evaluation [ Table 8 ]. Provinces with an orange warming level [total score of 1-1.5] are not allocated an annual development quota for further wind power construction. In provinces with a red warning level [total score below 1], local authorities should further suspend approval of new wind power projects [including for projects in outstanding annual development quota], and grid companies are to halt new grid connection procedures. For provinces where the minimum guaranteed number of full-load hours is not met [Measures for the guaranteed minimum purchase of renewable power], a red warning will automatically be issued. Provinces curtailment exceeding 20% or more will automatically be issued at least an orange warning.
For 2016, 7 provinces in the "Three Norths" region [Gansu, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and the Northern part of Hebei] were issued either a red or orange warning [46] . Because a number of these provinces are so far removed from attaining the guaranteed minimum hours or curtailment targets [Measures for the guaranteed minimum purchase of renewable power], it will likely be some time before construction here will resume. It is not clear how much of the 28.2 GW under construction or approved in the seven provinces with red or orange warnings may be stopped entirely, but it would be in line with the central government's plan to do so for a large share of those projects [see also Table 3 ]. The 44.5 GW of capacity under construction or approved in the "Three Norths" region already well exceeds the 30 GW of targeted growth by 2020 [ Table 3 ]. Simultaneously, the high amount of capacity under construction or approved in the East, South, and Central regions indicate the industry has not had much problems shifting the focus of their development operations away from the Northern regions, making it likely that annual additions to wind power capacity will remain at the level of several dozen GW a year in the foreseeable future. Capacity refers to substation capacity. Source: [19, 28, 66] . Overview includes all projects approved or under construction, of 1000+ kV AC or 800+ kV DC.
Power market reform
China's most recent round of power market reform has been ongoing since 2015, when the central government published a vision that stressed a need for more marketbased electricity pricing, and direct trading mechanisms [CPC and State Council, 47, 48] . This is in contrast with the current situation, where grid companies are the sole buyer and seller of electricity, both at predetermined tariff levels. Ministries and provincial level governments have responded to this vision with a number of changes, most of these in piloting or draft phase [49] . First, these include a call to reduce cross-subsidization, reducing or ending the practice of preferential pricing for separate industries in individual provinces [50] . Reviews of such cross-subsidization levels were due by November 2016, and only three provinces have published simplified pricing structures so far, with others likely following within the next few months.
Second, measures have established priority dispatch and guaranteed purchase of power from renewable sources, see also Measures for the guaranteed minimum purchase of renewable power [8, 44, 45] .
Third, the separation of tariffs for power consumption and transmission and distribution services [50, 51] . These have been proposed in order to ensure sufficient levels of profitability for grid companies, in a system with more direct and more market based electricity pricing, as well as reduced demand [more in 48] . Initially piloted in six provinces such reforms have been rolled out nation-wide by September of 2016 [48, 50] .
Fourth, and related, the further promotion of demand side management mechanisms. The use of DSM is not new; at least since the 11th FYP period China has been using such mechanisms as interruptible load tariffs, voluntary load shifting, time-of-use pricing, etc., although often limited to specific industries or localities [48, 52] . Room for improvement certainly still exists, as the peakto-valley ratio for China is circa 1:0.07, far below that in advanced economy markets [12] . The separation of electricity and transmission and distribution charges is expected to stimulate more widespread roll-out of DSM, as it removes the previously existing perverse incentive for grid companies to keep demand high [48, 52] .
Fifth, the creation of more market based electricity pricing mechanisms. Draft regulations include stipulations for direct trading between power companies and users, in the form of long-term supply contracts as well as in spot-markets [49] . Between September and December 2016, every individual province has published a market reform plan that either pilots or researches such new market mechanisms, establishes a provincial trading center as well as market regulation commissions [e.g., 53]. Two national electric power trading centers difference from the officially reported number of 1225 full-load hours as the national average (Table 2) . 3 Multiple values are valid for areas with different PV resource classes within the province. Some provinces have a minimum set only for some specific areas.
Sources: [44, 67, 68] . Source: [46] .
are established in Beijing and Guangzhou, focused on intraprovincial and intra-regional trading [54] . The draft regulations further indicate that experiences from such experimentation may in the future be expanded to mechanisms such as a capacity market, electricity futures, and derivatives trading [49] . The forms of power trading will exist alongside existing fixed tariffs for the foreseeable future. The creation of spot markets in particular will be key to improving the competitive strength of intermittent renewables, which have close to zero marginal cost, and which will be receiving subsidies regardless of prices offered in spot markets [Measures for the guaranteed minimum purchase of renewable power]. Further, the differentiated pricing will be key to linking the generation of intermittent renewables with energy storage in pumped hydro or large-scale battery storage facilities. Maximizing both financial and environmental benefits will require that such facilities can charge with cheap, off-peak renewables and discharge at times of peak demand and pricing.
Carbon markets
China has been experimenting with carbon markets since the start of the 12th FYP period. Over 2013 and 2014, pilot markets for voluntary trading of carbon rights became operational in two provinces and five major cities [55] . The pilots cover a selection of industries and assigned carbon emission allowances, allocation mechanisms, offset mechanisms, and minimum and maximum pricing [for a good overview, see 56] .
The volume traded, as a fraction of overall caps, has remained lower than in comparable schemes in the EU and California [56] . This is due in part to generous allocations for the pilot phase, but also because trading is restricted to trading within individual pilot regions, and lack of clarity on banking of pilot phase allowances for the future nationally operational scheme [56, 57] . The same issues have also suppressed pricing, with current pricing levels expected to have little influence on investment decisions in the short term [57] .
The expectation was that the pilots would transition to a national scheme by 2015 [55] , but this has been delayed. The State Council has recently announced a target for such a national scheme in operation by 2017 [58] . Draft regulations on the management of carbon emissions trading have been circulating since January of 2016 [59] . An earlier document specified that companies with energy consumption surpassing 10 kt of standard coal, in eight industries [electric power, petrochemical, chemical, building materials, iron and steel making, nonferrous metals, pulp and papermaking, and aviation] would be included in the national emission scheme [56, 60] . These documents thus identify the scope of the future emissions cap-and-trade system, but do not specify targets. Concrete targets from related policy documents are 865 g/kWh for coal-fired power generation [1] , and 550 g/kWh for large power generation enterprises [average of all power sources] [58] . It is not clear if these exact same targets will also be incorporated in the future cap-and-trade system.
Synopsis
Presuming that China will not overshoot its growth targets for wind and PV, annual additions over the 13th FYP period will average 16 GW for wind and 13.5 GW for PV, well below the growth levels seen in recent years. Still, even in this scenario, China's annual additions of hydro, wind, solar, and biomass combined, would average 42 GW of growth per year, or more than a third of expected global additions [61] .
The key to success in China's continued transition to renewable energy, however, does not lie in such capacity additions alone. At least as important will be the efforts at improving grid interconnectedness, flexibility of generating capacity and the grid, market mechanisms that will reduce and spread demand and better enable renewables to compete, and increased levels of consumption of the renewable power generated.
This will bring challenges for energy policy analysts, as these sorts of developments may not be as easy to track as installations, which are better reported on, both in Chinese and English language sources. It will also bring new avenues for exchanges of experiences from other countries that are transitioning to high levels of renewables and are experimenting with mechanisms to integrate these into their grid.
